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INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Lorin Blauer seeks review of a decision by the Utah Career Service
Review Board entered June 28,2006 (Addendum at Attachment 1), and its denial of
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration dated July 27,2006 (Addendum at Attachment 2
hereto).
JURISDICTION
By this Petition, Petitioner seeks review of orders issued by the Utah Career
Service Review Board ("CSRB"), an administrative body created under Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19(a)-201. The CSRB ruling followed a formal adjudicative proceeding, upholding
Mr. Blauer's termination from his employment as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III for the
Utah State Department of Workforce Services, despite his physical and psychological
inability to perform the duties which he had been reassigned in retaliation for challenging
a performance evaluation. Jurisdiction obtains pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2(a)3(2)(a).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether CSRB erroneously interpreted or applied the law in determining

that DWS properly terminated Petitioner's employment with the state for failure to return
to work within one year after the last day worked, even though it made no effort to place
him in the best available, vacant position which he qualifies, and for which he was able to
perform the essential functions notwithstanding physical or psychological disability.
770966v2
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2.

Whether CSRB erred in finding that the propriety of DWS' termination

decision concerning Petitioner was supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
light of the whole record before it; specifically:
(a) whether Petitioner was properly determined to be disabled, within the
meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act, solely for "psychopathological
illness";
(b) whether DWS presented any evidence whatever establishing that, at the
time of his termination, Petitioner was unable to perform the "essential functions"
of his prior position as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III (as such functions had been
established by custom and practice over 23 years), or that such position was not
available for him at that time;
(c) whether DWS presented any evidence whatever to suggest that, at any
time, DWS made any effort to place Petitioner in the best available, vacant
position for which he qualified, and of which he was able to perform the essential
functions without reasonable accommodation, despite his disability;
(d) whether DWS presented any evidence in the record that Petitioner was
obliged, prior to his termination, to establish his ability to return to work with a
medical release.
3.

770966v2

Whether this Petition was untimely.
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The standard of review for Issues 1 and 3 is de novo review for correct application
and interpretation of the law - Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d); Tasters Limited, Inc.
v. Department ofEmployment Security, 863 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1993); cert denied 878
P.2dll54.
Issue 2 is reviewed for support by substantial evidence viewed in light of the
whole record before the Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g); the
decision is sustainable only if reasonable minds would accept as adequate the quantum of
evidence necessary to support the conclusion. Acosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 Utah
App. 67,44 P.3d 819, cert, denied 48 P.3d 797.
DETERMINATIVE CASE LAW AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
1.

Federal Statutory Provisions
42 U.S.C.,§ 12101, etseq.

2.

State Statutory and Administrative Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202(l)(a) and (3)
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-407
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-408
Utah Administrative Code, R477-7-17(3)(a)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant, Lorin Blauer, filed an appeal on November 16,2005, from the
decision of the DWS Executive Director dated November 3,2004 which terminated his
employment. A Step 5 evidentiary hearing was conducted by a hearing officer for the
770966v2
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Career Service Review Board, on August 18 and 19,2005. The hearing officer issued his
decision denying appellant's appeal on September 19, 2005. The appellant filed his
appeal to the Career Service Review Board on September 28,2005. CSRB issued its
decision on June 28, 2006, denying Mr. Blauer's appeal (Addendum at Attachment 1) and
holding that his termination had been proper notwithstanding DWS' failure to afford him
proper reinstatement to his prior job responsibilities as required by rule. CSRB denied
Mr. Blauer's Request to Reconsider by order dated July 27, 2006 (Addendum at
Attachment 2). Mr. Blauer filed his Petition for Review with this Court on August 1,
2006.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Petitioner began working for the Department of Employment Security

(now Department of Workforce Services; hereinafter referred to as DWS) on a temporary
basis in 1980. R. 894 at 161:21-25,162:1-5.
2.

In September, 1981, Mr. Blauer achieved merit status as Legal Counsel. Id.

3.

Mr. Blauer worked for the department for 23 years as Legal Counsel (now

Legal/Enforcement Counsel III). R. 894 at 218:24-25.
4.

Membership in the Utah State Bar was a required qualification of the job.

R. 894 at 221:3-6, Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895).
5.

Mr. Blauer's initial responsibilities as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III

included researching legal issues and writing legal opinions for the department; advising

770966v2
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Appeals Referees (now Administrative Law Judge-DWS or Administrative Law Judge Non Juris Doctorate); when they had legal issues arise in the course of a hearing and
requested a legal opinion; advising the Board of Review (now Workforce Appeals Board)
regarding factual and legal issues raised in appeals from decisions of Department
Administrative Law Judges; writing decisions for the Board and defending those
decisions with legal briefs to and oral arguments in the Utah Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals. R. 894 at 219:5 through 221:2, Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895).
6.

In 1986, Mr. Blauer was temporarily assigned to hold hearings as a

Department Appeals Referee as a voluntary reassignment mutually agreed upon according
to rules (later changed to Administrative Law Judge - Non Juris Doctorate and referred to
hereinafter as ALJ) so that he would have a better feel for what that job entailed. This
would help him in his job as Legal Counsel since his job was to review decisions of the
ALJs and advise the Board as to whether the ALJs had made errors in their decisions or in
their fact finding processes. R 894 at 218:25 through 219:14,221:10-24, Appellant's
Exhibit 1 (R. 786, 895). Though the name of the ALJ position has changed, the
responsibilities have not changed in any significant way. The job does not now require,
nor has it ever required, a law degree. R. 894 at 223:1-23,239:9-12, 336:18 through
341:20, 343:21 through 344:5, Appellant's Exhibit 12 (R. 788-789, 895)
7.

Over the last five years of the Petitioner's performance of his duties, and

indeed for essentially most of Mr. Blauer's career, the duties of acting as Legal Counsel

770966v2
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to the Workforce Appeals Board comprised 50 percent of his job responsibilities as
defined by his Position Description Questionnaire. R. 894 at 225:16 through 226:22.
8.

Mr. Blauer was also legal counsel to the Contributions Unit of the

Department, representing them in court garnishment and collection matters, in bankruptcy
matters and in needed legal opinions. He reviewed sub plans and contracts for the
department. Id.
9.

Further, Mr. Blauer served on a prosecution board to decide with the other

members whether certain cases met the requirements for referring to the County
Attorney's office for prosecution, and then referred those cases to the County Attorney.
He served under the title "Special Assistant Attorney General" as authorized by the
Attorney General's Office. Id.
10.

Mr. Blauer was also the Information Disclosure Attorney whose

responsibility it was to advise the internal auditor, John Levanger. Together,
Mr. Levanger and Mr. Blauer would make the determination, upon receipt of requests for
disclosure on issues of disclosure agreements relative to department records, whether
providing the information would or would not have a chilling effect on employers in
filing their reports or claimants filing their claims. Id.
11.

Mr. Blauer also was responsible for responding to subpoenas. On

numerous occasions he appeared and opposed subpoenas for the department's
information, in both State and Federal Court. R. 894 at 226:23 through 227:2.

770966v2
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12.

All of the above responsibilities are listed on Mr. Blauer's job description

(i.e., Position Description Questionnaire, hereinafter PDQ) because they were essential to
the purpose of his position. Holding unemployment insurance hearings, though, is not a
task listed on the DHRMJob Description for Legal/Enforcement Counsel III; neither was
the holding of unemployment insurance hearings a task ever listed on any PDQ issued in
connection with Mr. Blauer fs position. Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895);
Appellant's Exhibit 2 (R. 787, 895).
13.

However, holding hearings is a task listed on the DHRM Job Description

for Administrative Law Judge-DWS (same as Administrative Law Judge-non juris
Doctorate so also hereinafter referred to as ALJ). Petitioner's Exhibit 12 (R. 788-789,
895).
14.

Holding hearings was never a part of Mr. Blauer's regular assignments as

Legal/Enforcement Counsel III; nor was he asked to do it as a temporary or special
assignment ("other duties as assigned") for 18 of the 23 years Mr. Blauer served as Legal
Counsel. It has never appeared on his PDQ or his official DHRM job description.
Appellant's Exhibit 16 (R. 790-791; 895); Appellant's Exhibit 2 (R. 787, 895);
Petitioner's Exhibit 12 (R. 788-789, 895).
15.

Sometime during her tenure as Mr. Blauer's supervisor, Virginia (Ginger)

Smith, (who preceded Tani Downing as Mr. Blauer's supervisor) temporarily assigned
Mr. Blauer to conduct two hearings a week as a "special assignment." According to his

770966v2
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PDQ, special assignments may comprise 10% of his workload. Two hearings a week
would be just that - 10%. R. 894 at 242:11-22,243:20-24,246:3-13, Appellant's Exhibit
2 (R. 787, 895). Occasionally Mr. Blauer conducted more hearings if an ALJ was ill or
had scheduling conflicts. During this time, Mr. Blauer in order to be a helpful team
player had no problems or objections to holding such hearings. R. 894 at 242:23 through
243:10.
16.

About a year after becoming Mr. Blauer's supervisor, Tani Downing

incrementally increased the number of hearings assigned to Mr. Blauer from two cases to
eight cases per week. R. 894 at 251:8-15. Mr. Blauer experienced physical difficulty
conducting eight hearings a week because the long periods of sitting exacerbated his
sciatic nerve problem (see below), causing, as stated by his physician, severe "distracting
pain". R. 894 at 252:13-23.
17.

Mr. Blauer consulted Doctors Perry Lofthouse and Dennis Peterson about

his sciatic nerve problem. He was advised he should not be sitting or standing still for
more than 20-30 minutes at a time. Mr. Blauer conveyed this information to Ms.
Downing. Rather than accommodating Mr. Blauer's physical limitations, she actually
increased his hearing assignments to 20 cases a week (a full time work load for an ALJ)
which would have effectively crippled the Claimant. R. 893 at 111:13-22; R. 894 at
252:24 through 253:18.
18.

770966v2
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894 atl63:l 1-13,164:11-12), in June of 2003, Mr. Blauer "had fairly severe sciatica or
pain radiating from the low back and sacral region through the buttocks down the left
lateral leg to the knee, then down to the—the lateral foreleg, into the foot. There was some
numbness in the dorsum of the left foot". R 894 at 166:1-16. The pain was caused by
generalized degeneration of the lower spine resulting in an impingement on the nerves
coming from the lower spine and down that region. He had been dealing with this for
some time fairly successfully but now it was in extreme exacerbation. R 894 at 167:21
through 167:25.
19.

The cause of the exacerbation was "an increase in seated work" which is

"something that intensified the pain, that tends to stretch the nerve around the comer of
the hip or the buttock and pulls .. .the nerve into contact." Standing stationary, especially
in cases of spinal stenosis such as Petitioner's, "will make that worse". R 894 at 168:1
through 169:3.
20.

Dr. Peterson was aware of Mr. Blauer's duties as Legal/Enforcement

Counsel III and that those duties were changed to holding administrative hearings in
midyear of 2003. He knew that "sitting and running hearings.. .had disabled" Petitioner.
Mr. Blauer has since undergone major surgery in an attempt to correct this problem - a
problem exacerbated by the assignment of Ms. Downing during which surgery he nearly
lost the use of his legs. R. 894 at 192:21 through 193:24.
21.

770966v2
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medical leave on October 8,2003. R. 893 at 10:23-25. He applied for long term
disability on January 26,2004 (Agency's Exhibit 1, R. 798, 895), and was approved for
long term disability on July 14,2004 (Agency's Exhibits 4 and 5, R. 808, 895).
22.

Prior to being approved for long term disability, Mr. Blauer's

Administrative Representative, Tom Cantrell, hand-delivered to Ms. Downing a letter
from Mr. Blauer dated June 4,2004, wherein he requested that he "be allowed to return to
work to perform my historical duties as Legal Counsel within the medical parameters that
has been certified by Dr. Peterson who has cleared me for work as Legal Counsel but not
for Administrative Law Judge". Petitioner's Exhibit 21, R. 792, 895.
23.

In order to determine whether Mr. Blauer should be granted long term

disability, the Long-Term Disability Program arranged for an Independent Psychological
Evaluation of Petitioner by Darrell H. Hart, Ph.D. As a part of his evaluation, Dr. Hart
reviewed Mr. Blauer's medical information. He details the recommendations given to
DWS by Doctors Dennis R. Peterson and Perry Lofthouse in behalf of Mr. Blauer to
enable him to work effectively. Agency Exhibit 2 (R. 799-805, 895), pages 2 and 3. Dr.
Hart noted on page 13 of his evaluation that:"[Petitioner] is indeed suffering from
psychopathology..." and "The condition does cause a total inability to perform his normal
work as assigned in midyear 2003. If there were significant accommodations made
which would include modification of the workload and if [Petitioner] had a different
supervisor, I would predict his level of depression and anxiety drop from moderate/severe
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to mild. If that were the case, he could perform the functions and tasks associated with
modified accommodations at the level of adequacy which he had performed in the pas f9
(italics added). Id.
24.

Dr. Peterson advised Mr. Blauer's attorney, Vince Rampton, in 2004 that

Mr. Blauer could perform the essential functions of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III.
25.

Attorney Rampton then advised the department in a letter dated October 4,

2004 that Mr. Blauer was able and available to return to his position as Legal Counsel III
if such position was available. R. 894 at 172:3 through 174:5.
26.

The department responded in a letter dated October 8,2004 stating that the

position was available but only with duties assigned at the discretion of management.
Agency Exhibit 6 (R. 895). This clearly meant, in the context of Mr. Rampton's letter
and the department's response, and their position regularly communicated both verbally
and in writing that Mr. Blauer would be expected to hold unemployment hearings full
time - a prospect fully admitted by Tani Downing on the stand (R. I l l :2-23).
27.

Scott Steele, who conducted the Petitioner's informal Step 4 hearing on

behalf of the Executive Director, testified that Mr. Blauer had notified DWS that "he was
able to return to work if he could identify what he could do and the extent of what his job
would be." R. 893 at 63:22-25. Mr. Steele testified that, to his understanding, Mr. Blauer
was offered the job of "...Legal Counsel III... That was a job that had multiple parts to
that job of duties that could be assigned in accordance with the performance plan of that

770966v2
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job. One of those duties was to conduct hearings. And - he was being offered that
position to come back and conduct hearings. ..I believe that they said his primary job
duties would be to be (sic) conduct hearings". R. 893 at 66:23 through 68:3.
28.

Mr. Blauer's employment was terminated by letter dated November 3,2004

(Agency Exhibit 7, R. 895). In its letter, DWS made no mention whatever of Mr.
Blauer's offer to return to work with reasonable accommodation, as set out in his
counsel's letter (which was not mentioned in the November 3 letter at all), and no
mention of failure to furnish a medical release. Id.
29.

DWS offered no reason for termination of Mr. Blauer's employment, other

than Utah Administrative Code R477-7-17(l)(3)(a), (b) and (c). R. 893 at 38:16 through
39:1; Agency Exhibit 6 (R. 895). In deciding to terminate Mr. Blauer's employment
DWS Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell acknowledged that she was not
qualified to speak to the question of what constituted the "essential functions" of
positions within DWS - "I do not do the ADA work. We have a separate ADA
coordinator that handles that and determines essential functions." R. 893 at 46:13-17.
30.

Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell acknowledged that

termination of Mr. Blauer's employment after one year of absence was not mandated that circumstances existed where the time period was flexible. R. 893 at 51:4-21.
31.

In imposing the requirement that Petitioner come back to work solely to

conduct hearings (which his physical disabilities prohibited him from doing), Tani
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Downing (General Counsel and Director of the Division of Adjudication for DWS, and
Mr. Blauer's superior) was aware that, over the course of his career, Mr. Blauer had acted
as legal counsel concerned with collections, information disclosure and contract review.
R. 893 at 83:2-9.
32.

DWS (Tani Downing in collaboration with Jo Anne Campbell) determined

to terminate Mr. Blauer's employment based on his representation that, while he could
and would return as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, he could not conduct hearings full
time - a restriction which DWS unilaterally determined that Mr. Blauer would not be
allowed to make:
"Well, sir, the question was whether he was offered the same job. My
understanding was that the department communicated that his legal counsel
III position job was still available but that he would have to perform
whatever duties within that job he was assigned, and that he could not select
his supervisor."
R. 893 at 96:5-11.
33.

Tani Downing communicated to Jo Anne Campbell (and Jo Anne Campbell

communicated to Mr. Blauer) that, while he could return to work as Legal/Enforcement
Counsel III, "he would have to be willing to come back and take any of those
assignments". R. 893 at 110:7-9; Agency Exhibit 5 (R. 895). See also R. 893 at 113:21
through 114:5.
34.

In hearing, DWS acknowledged that Mr. Blauer had attempted, through a

letterfromhis counsel, to explain that while he was willing to come back as

770966v2

13

Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, there were physical limitations on what aspects of that
job he could perform with or without reasonable accommodation. In her testimony,
however, Tani Downing openly admitted to rejecting the imposition of any such condition
or limitation:
"There was a letter back from Mr. Blauer's attorney, I believe, saying he'll
do it but only under these conditions. She came to me and asked me if
that-you know, what I-what I thought of that. And I said, 'no. He needs to
be coming back without being able to specify duties or supervisor at all.'"
R. 893 at 114:24 through 115:6.
35.

In extending the offer to Petitioner to return to work, therefore, DWS

contemplated that he would come back in order to do the same job he had done on the last
day of his employment (the full-time holding of administrative hearings). R. 893 at
117:15-22.
36.

Since this matter has been pending, DWS has claimed that it relied, in part,

on Mr. Blauer's failure to furnish a "medical release" incident to his agreement to return
to work. However, (1) Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell acknowledged that,
where job functions upon return did not entail the disability for which disability relief had
been offered, no such medical release would necessarily be required (R. 893 at 55:1-21);
and (2) failure to produce a medical release was not given as a reason for termination
(Agency Exhibit 6, R. 895).
37.

With respect to marshaling evidence supporting the ruling of the Career

Services Review Board herein, DWS offered the following:
770966v2
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A.

Testimony of DWS' Human Resources Director Jo Anne Campbell

that she terminated Mr. Blauer's employment effective November 8, 2004, pursuant to
Utah Administrative Code R477-7-17(l) and (3)(a), (b) and (c), when he attempted to
impose conditions upon his return, due to personal disability (R. 893 at 9:18 through 56:9
and Agency Exhibits 1-7 (R. 895));
B.

Ms. Campbell further testified that Mr. Blauer had been granted

long-term disability benefits by reason of "psychological illness" (Agency Exhibit 4, R.
895), and that he did not furnish a medical release. Mr. Blauer's counsel's letter was
apparently inadequate for DWS, even though (1) no correspondence notified Mr. Blauer
that any particular release was required, or that the letter from counsel was insufficient,
and (2) failure to provide a medical release is not listed in his termination letter as a factor
in termination-Agency Exhibits 3-7 (R. 895));
C.

While Mr. Blauer agreed to come back to work, he attempted to

impose conditions on his return by reason of personal disability - something which is
superior, Tani Downing, flatly refused to let him do (R. 893 at 114:24 through 115:6).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner Lorin Blauer was entitled, at the conclusion of his leave period, to rights
set out at R477-7-17(3), Utah Admin. Code:
Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include:
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day
worked, the agency shall place the employee in the previously held position
770966v2
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or similar position in a comparable salary range provided the employee is
able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a
reasonable accommodation.
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the
position because of a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under
the ADA, the agency shall offer the employee a reassignment to one or
more immediately available vacant positions, for which the employee
qualifies, and whose essential functions the employee is able to perform
without a reasonable accommodation.
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last
day worked, the employee shall be separated from state employment.
As Mr. Blauer, his administrative representative, his legal representative and his health
care providers had notified DWS on numerous occasions, he was fully capable of
resuming, at the conclusion of his leave period or at any other time, his traditional,
historic duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, but could not, for both physiological
and psychological reasons, do administrative hearings to the extent required by DWS and
to the exclusion of all else. His legal counsel reiterated these facts in response to DWS'
October, 2004 communications concerning his return following the leave period. But
DWS - for reasons which it did not even attempt to explain to the Hearing Officer determined that, alone among all Legal/ Enforcement Counsel employed by DWS, Mr.
Blauer must do 100% administrative hearings or nothing. The only offered explanation
of its position was that supervisor Tani Downing was not about to have Mr. Blauer dictate
the terms of his employment.

770966v2
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In upholding the Hearing Officer's findings, conclusions and order, CSRB
disregarded completely the requirements of subdivision (b) of R477-7-17(3), concluding
that because Mr. Blauer had failed to demonstrate re-employability under the standards of
subdivision (a) thereof, his termination was justified under subdivision (c).
Evidence submitted failed to offer even marginal, much less substantial, support
for CSRB's ruling. CSRB's analysis rested in significant part on the assertion that Mr.
Blauer's long-term disability was for "psychopathalogical reasons" - ignoring completely
uncontroverted testimony that he was also suffering from physiological disability which
prevented his acceptance of an assignment confining him to full-time administrative
hearings. CSRB similarly ignored the facts that - again by uncontroverted testimony Mr. Blauer was fully capable, both physically and psychologically, of re-assuming his
prior duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, so long as hearings were not the sum and
substance of his job; that DWS made no effort to determine whether his request in this
regard could be accommodated; that DWS made no showing that the holding of hearings
full-time was an "essential function" of the position under governing ADA regulations as
adopted under DHRM rule; or that DWS made no attempt to find other, immediatelyvacant positions the essential functions of which Mr. Blauer couId perform without
reasonable accommodation. His termination was therefore unjustified.
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This petition, finally, is not untimely. It was pursued within 30 days of CSRB's
final action on Mr. Blauer's request for reconsideration, and the timeliness of that request
places no limitations on the jurisdiction of this Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CSRB ERRONEOUSLY INTERPRETED AND APPLIED
GOVERNING LAW IN CONCLUDING THAT DWS PROPERLY
TERMINATED PETITIONER'S EMPLOYMENT FOR FAILURE
TO RETURN TO WORK WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE LAST
DAY WORKED.
As noted in the Statement of Facts, the evidence was clear - and in fact
uncontroverted - that Mr. Blauer was terminated from his employment based on DWS'
discretionary application of a policy terminating employees after one year of long-term
disability, where the employees are unable to return to work at that time.
But where an employee is disabled, yet able to return to work under certain
conditions, DWS' authority to terminate the employee was, in October of 2004, restricted
by operation of R477-7-17(3):
Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include:
(a) If an employee is able to return to work within one year of the last day
worked, the agency shall place the employee in the previously held position
or similar position in a comparable salary range provided the employee is
able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without a
reasonable accommodation.
(b) If an employee is unable to perform the essential functions of the
position because of a permanent disability that qualifies as a disability under
770966v2
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the ADA, the agency shall offer the employee a reassignment to one or
more immediately available vacant positions, for which the employee
qualifies, and whose essential functions the employee is able to perform
without a reasonable accommodation.
(c) If an employee is unable to return to work within one year after the last
day worked, the employee shall be separated from state employment.1
In upholding Petitioner's termination, the CSRB reviewed the hearing examiner's
findings (and the evidence underlying those findings) against the legal standard
articulated by subsection (a) of the foregoing provision-fet// completely omittedfrom its
decision the language or impact of subsection (b). At pages 16-19 of its June 28,2006,
Decision and Final Agency Action (R871-874), entitled "Legal Issues Regarding the
Department's Termination of Appellant's Employment for Failure to Return to Work
Within One Year as Required by DHRM Rule R477-7-17", CSRB quoted subsection (a)
of R477-7-17(3), concluded that because Petitioner had not established (and
documented - see Point 11(C), below) that he was "able to return to work" (i.e., able to go
back and perform administrative law hearings full-time, the job change which had
resulted in his disability to begin with), and since DWS was entitled, in its discretion, to
structure his job responsibilities any way it chose, regardless of disability, it was justified
infiringhim under subsection (c). Id.

!

R477-7-17(3) has since been amended to eliminate express reference to the ADA,
although a state employee's right to be placed in a position the essential functions of
which he/she can perform with or without reasonable accommodation has been preserved.
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CSRB's evaluation of the evidence, like that of the hearing officer's, was
fundamentally flawed - see Point II, below. As a threshold issue, however, it must be
observed that it occurred in the context of an erroneous legal standard. Subsection (b) of
R477-7-17(3) imposed an alternate reinstatement standard - one which, by its express
terms, invokes the language and standards adopted pursuant to the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C., § 12101, et seq. As more fully discussed at Point II(B.),
below, ADA standards invoke a factual analysis very different from that relied on by the
Hearing Officer, and CSRB on review.
Simply put, Petitioner notified DWS, immediately prior to his termination, that he
could not, by reason of disabilityy return to the responsibilities to which he had been
assigned immediately prior to his departure: the holding of administrative law hearings
full-time. He notified them, however, that he could return to the position of
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III as he had performed it for over 20 years, conducting some
hearings, but performing other job duties as well. This, however, Ms. Downing flatly
rejected - "He needs to be coming back without being able to specify duties or
supervisors at all." (R893 at 114:24 through 115:6). This "my way or the highway"
attitude was, in the mind of DWS and its personnel, the sum and substance of what
"reasonable accommodation" was due Petitioner, on pain of termination.
The language of the law plainly demonstrates that DWS was required to do more
than this. It was required to offer Petitioner a reassignment to one or more immediately
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available vacant positions - positions for which he qualified, and the essential functions
of which he could perform without a reasonable accommodation. The record is utterly
devoid of any sign that either the Hearing Officer or CSRB imposed such a legal standard
on DWS. Nowhere was DWS (which bore the burden of proof in this matter) put to the
task of coming forward with evidence that it took any effort to analyze Petitioner's
disability status, compared against available vacant positions for which he was otherwise
qualified, and make any determination of where he could be reassigned. Worse still,
DWS completely disregarded - without any justification appearing anywhere in the
record - Petitioner's own suggestion that he simply be permitted to return as
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III with the same or similar mix of duties and responsibilities
which had been entrusted to him over the course of more than two decades. DWS'
personnel freely admitted that they dismissed this suggestion out of hand, hiding behind
definitions and descriptions contained in DHRM regulations to conclude that, in order to
be "able to return to work" (a standard under subsection (a), not subsection (b)),
Petitioner had to demonstrate himself able to perform all functions (and especially all
"core functions" in whatever proportions DWS dictated, apparently) falling within the job
description of the position in question. This, concluded CSRB, was all that was
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incumbent upon DWS when faced with Petitioner's offer to return to work under
conditions that would accommodate his disability.2
The language of R477-7-17(3)(b), and the ADA-mandated legal standards which it
incorporates by reference, required far more of DWS than it afforded to Petitioner. In its
stretch to uphold DWS' decision, though, CSRB shifted its focus to a separate legal
standard - one which, under the undisputed facts of this matter, did not apply in
Petitioner's case. On this basis alone, CSRB's decision, and that of its hearing examiner,
constituted an erroneous interpretation of governing law, and mandates reversal.

2

It is illuminating that, having rubber-stamped DWS' position in this regard, CSRB
dismissed Petitioner's observation that his "reassignment" to perform administrative law
hearings full-time was the functional equivalent of being made an administrative law
judge out of hand, labeling it "sophistic") (R871). To the contrary, it was DWS' line of
reasoning which was "sophistic" - (1) to qualify for reinstatement, Petitioner needed to be
able to perform all functions falling under the heading of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III
(or whatever mix of those functions DWS, in its sole and unfettered discretion, saw fit to
impose upon him, with full knowledge of his disability); (2) the holding of administrative
law hearings constituted a "core function" under the job description of
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III (even though, in practice, Petitioner had never been
required to devote more than a small fraction of his time to the conducting of such
hearings before being abruptly reassigned to hold hearings full-time by his supervisor, a
decision which created his disability to begin with); and (3) because he could not do what
he was told and hold administrative law hearings full-time, his termination was justified
without any further effort at reasonable accommodation.
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POINT II
THE CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT DWS' TERMINATION OF
PETITIONER WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
VIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE ENTIRE RECORD BEFORE IT.
In holding Mr. Blauer to the standard imposed by R477-7- 17(a) (not (b), as
discussed under Point I), the CSRB affirmed the Findings of Fact entered by the Hearing
Officer to the effect that (1) Mr. Blauer suffered solelyfroma "psychopathological
illness", which, because it had been relied upon in extending long-term disability to him,
was the sole basis of his "disability," and (2) his offer to return to work was not supported
by medical documentation that his "psychopathological illness" had ameliorated to any
degree. See R. 871.
In fact, the CSRB's opinion (like the Findings of Fact entered by the Hearing
Officer) completely skirts the issue. First, Mr. Blauer suffered from both physical and
psychological disabilities. Second, neither of these prevented him from doing the
"essential functions" of the position which he had held for 23 years — with or without
reasonable accommodation (maintenance of his historic duties), he could perform - and
had been performing - the "essential functions" of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, as
those functions had been established by long practice. Third, Mr. Blauer's failure to
furnish a medical release concerning the foregoing was an afterthought — it was not
required of him as part of any pre-termination communication, and was not listed as a
reason for his termination.
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A.

The Petitioner was not properly determined to be disabled, within the
meaning of the Americans With Disabilities Act, solely for
"psychopathological illness".

Mr. Blauer does indeed suffer a disability as defined under the American's with
Disabilities Act (ADA), but not limited to that addressed by the Hearing Officer or
CSRB. In the second sentence of paragraph 6 of his Findings of Fact, the Hearing Officer
states: "Dr. Hart concluded that Grievant suffered from psychopathological illness, and
that Grievant's condition was sufficiently severe to cause a total inability to perform his
normal work as assigned." This statement is accurate, but incomplete. The balance of
Dr. Hart's statement is:"... as assigned in mid year 2003." Agency's Exhibit 2, R. 895,
page 13, paragraph 2. As assigned prior to that time, Mr. Blauer was fully capable of
performing the essential functions of his job as set by longstanding practice.
Dr. Hart's conclusion in his Independent Psychological Evaluation that Grievant is
unable to hold unemployment insurance hearings full time but could perform his regular
duties as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III was fully supported by the testimony of
Grievant's personal physician, Dr. Dennis R. Peterson that physiologically Grievant is
unable to hold hearings full time but could perform his regular historical duties as
Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. Dr. Peterson testified at length concerning Grievant's
sciatica, mini-traumatic stress disorder, numbness in the lower extremities and feet,
arising generally from degeneration of the lower spine and impingement on the spinal
column - all in a state of severe exacerbation during mid-2003 (R. 894 at 163:11 through
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168:5). Dr. Peterson concluded that the exacerbation of Grievant's condition derived
from increased sitting and stationary standing. (R. 894 at 168:1-22) Dr. Peterson testified
that Appellant was physically disabled as a result of holding hearings (R. 894 at
192:21-25). His testimony stood uncontroverted and, in fact was supported by Dr. Hart's
report.
Mr. Blauer in fact was never disabled from any part of his regular, historic duties.
He could even conduct the occasional hearing as he had done without complaint until he
reached the number of eight hearings a week. He simply could not perform the increasing
and finally extreme number of hearings that Tani Downing attempted to force him to do
when she knew it was causing him pain and injury.
Dr. Hart's report states that the Grievant could continue to perform his regular
(historic) duties in the same manner and at the same (successful) level that he had
performed them for the previous 23 years (see report, Agency Exhibit 2, R. 895, page 13
"response to question #2" - "yes, the condition does cause a total inability to perform his
normal work as assigned in midyear 2003 [that is the assignment to conduct hearings full
time]... [however] he could perform the functions and tasks associated with modified
accommodations at the level of adequacy which he had performed in the past").
Even though Hart's report wholly supported Mr. Blauer's position, though, DWS
attempted to use it to support their claim that he could not perform his duties with or
without accommodation, and therefore justify their dismissal. This is a most telling point.
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It demonstrates that the Department is willing to twist and shift the facts and evidence in
order to justify their predisposition to get rid of a competent successful 23 year veteran
for untried reasons in violation of R477-7-17(3) (b), Utah Admin. Code.
B.

Mr. Blauer was shown to be capable of performing the "essential
functions" of his prior position with or without reasonable
accommodation.

Mr. Blauer testified, without contradiction, that he could perform the "essential
functions" of his historic position of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, as defined both by
the Position Description Questionnaire related to that position, and by long-standing
practice. R894 at 240:14-18. The holding of administrative hearings was never a
described function of Mr. Blauer's position under the Position Description Questionnaire;
however, he had held some hearings thereunder during his time in the position. R894 at
235:15-25; R895, Grievance Exhibit 16. Only when he was "reassigned" to do nothing
but conduct administrative law hearings to the extent assigned did Mr. Blauer's
disabilities impede his capacity to perform in his job — and this for physiological, as well
as psychological, reasons. R894 at 252:13-23. When Mr. Blauer conveyed information
concerning this difficulty to his supervisor, Tani Downing (and supported it with
information from his physician), he was assigned to do more hearings. R894 at 253:1
through 255:10. When this insistence forced him to apply for and receive long-term
disability, Mr. Blauer remained willing to return to work with a mix of duties which
would accommodate his disability. R895, Grievance Exhibit 7. Tani Downing, though,
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saw such conditions as Mr. Blauer's attempt to dictate the terms of his employment something for which she would not stand (R893 at 114:24 through 115:6). CSRB upheld
the Hearing Officer's finding that DWS had not abused its discretion in this regard,
noting only that the holding of unemployment hearings "had always been a 'core function
of a Legal/Enforcement Counsel II position'" R873.
Regulations enacted to implement the Americans With Disabilities Act (the
standards of which are incorporated by reference into R477-7-17(3)(b)) call for a far more
thoughtful probe of "essential functions" than that offered by the hearing officer or
CSRB:
(1) The term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the
employment position the individual with the disability holds or desires. The
term "essential functions" does not include the marginal functions of the
position.
(2) A job function may be considered essential for any of several reasons,
including but not limited to the following:
(i) The function may be essential because the reason the
position exists is to perform that function;
(ii) The function may be essential because of the limited
number of employees available among whom the performance
of that job function can be distributed; and/or
(iii) The function may be highly specialized so that the
incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or
ability to perform the particular function.
(3) Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not
limited to:
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(i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are
essential;
(ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job;
(iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the
function;
(iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to
perform the function;
(v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job;
and/or
(vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar
jobs.
29C.F.R.Partl630.2(n).
As noted above, Mr. Blauer equipped DWS with sufficient information and
medical documentation to permit "a reassignment to one or more immediately available
vacant positions, for which the employee qualifies, and whose essential functions the
employee is able to perform without a reasonable accommodation" (R477-7-17(3)(b),
Utah Admin. Code) under the foregoing standard. Mr. Blauer himself (as well as his
legal and administrative representatives) made abundantly clear to DWS that he could do
what he had always done as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III without any reasonable
accommodation. CSRB and its hearing officer, however, joined with DWS in the
unexplained decision that 23 years of history did not establish the "essential functions" of
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Mr. Blauer's position of Legal/ Enforcement Counsel III; that, rather, the "essential
functions" for that position (where he alone was concerned, apparently) had suddenly
metamorphosed into the conducting of administrative law hearings full-time. This,
according to the DWS (and CSRB) could be turned into the sole "essential function" of
Mr. Blauer's position as Legal/Enforcement Counsel III by administrative fiat alone. It is
submitted that what does and does not constitute an "essential function", as opposed to a
"marginal function", under the governing regulatory standard is simply not met by this
determination. While the employer's judgment as to which functions are "essential" and
which are not is evidence under the Regulation, so also are written job descriptions
(which, in this case, no where mentioned the conducting of administrative hearings); the
amount of time spent on performing the function (historically, less than 10 percent of Mr.
Blauer's duties); the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function
(nowhere addressed in DWS' case in chief); the work experience of past incumbents in
the job (similar if not identical to Mr. Blauer's historic experience - R894 at 244:6
through 250:23); and the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs (DWS
failed to identify a single individual holding the position of Legal/Enforcement Counsel
III assigned to do nothing but administrative law hearings).
In short, there exists no substantial evidence in the record to establish DWS'
compliance with the requirements of R477-7-17(3)(b), Utah Admin. Code.
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C.

DWS presented no evidence that it had attempted to place Mr.
Blauer in an immediately-vacant position the essential functions
of which he could perform without reasonable accommodation.

R477-7-17(3)(b) called upon DWS to take affirmative action if it did not want to
accept Mr. Blauer's suggestion concerning reinstatement in his prior duties. Upon
expiration of the year leave period, and with awareness of Mr. Blauer5 s disability, DWS
needed to "offer the employee a reassignment to one or more immediately available
vacant positions, for which the employee qualifies, and whose essential functions the
employee is able to perform without a reasonable accommodation". DWS offered not one
shred of evidence that it had even attempted to locate, much less offer to Mr. Blauer, such
an alternate position. It did, in fact, precisely the opposite, demanding that Mr. Blauer
accept assignment to the precise set of duties which, to their own express knowledge, he
could not perform due to disability, for no articulated reason other than the rules were
theirs - not his - to make. On this basis alone, CSRB's ruling must be reversed.
D.

DWS was not excused from compliance with R477-7-17(3)(B) by Mr.
Blauer's failure to provide medical documentation of his ability to
perform the essential functions of the position he had historically held.

As noted above, the record proves that Mr. Blauer was always able to perform the
essential functions of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III. Furthermore, there is no evidence
of record that he was ever informed, until long after his employment was terminated, that
he was deficient by not presenting a medical release in order to return to work. It is
reasonable for him to believe it was not necessary for him to provide such a release to
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perform the essential functions of Legal/Enforcement Counsel III, as established by
longstanding practice, that he had never been medically disabled from. It was also
reasonable for him to believe that the Department would have been satisfied in that regard
by the letter written by Vince Rampton (R. 895, Grievant's Exhibit 24) and previous
lettersfromhis medical provider already in record especially since there is no particular
required format for such a release. Therefore there did not appear to be a need for him to
present a more formal medical release in order to return to work to perform those
functions he had never been disqualified from.
Mr. Blauer was simply never told otherwise - not in the hearing before the
department representative representing Director Ireland, nor in Director Ireland's letter of
dismissal. It is important to note that neither in the letter of termination nor in the
testimony offered by the hiring authority, Raylene Ireland, was the matter of the alleged
failure to produce such a release ever made an issue or indicated as cause in Mr. Blauer's
termination. It was never brought up, in fact, until the hearing before CSRB Hearing
Officer Wallentine! It can only be assumed that it wasn't a factor in the dismissal and was
a moot point before the CSRB.
If it had been important to the Department for Mr. Blauer to produce something
more in the way of a medical release, the Department should have notified him of the
deficiency in time for him to produce such. To make a belated claim that the failure to
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produce such a release had any part of the decision is entirely pretext. It is clear that such
an alleged deficiency was not a proximate cause of the termination.
In the worst case scenario, assuming arguendo that Mr. Blauer's alleged failure to
present a medical release to return to work could be considered a terminable offense, it
would be incumbent upon the agency to advise Blauer, a 23-year employee of the agency,
that he needed to present such medical release and give him an opportunity to provide
such (or otherwise respond to the issue). If he refused to do so, then the agency may have
an argument for disciplining him, but he has a right to be noticed of any work-related
deficiency before discipline could be imposed.
In short, Mr. Blauer's failure to produce an un-demanded medical release as the
price of rehiring cannot be urged as "substantial evidence" of DWS' compliance with
regulatory standards incumbent on it prior to terminating his employment.
POINT III
PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT IS NOT
UNTIMELY.
In its Order of July 27, 2006, CSRB refused to consider Mr. Blauer's Request for
Reconsideration of its June 28 decision upholding the Hearing Officer's ruling herein,
stating only that its filing was untimely, and that it lacked jurisdiction on that basis. DWS
has taken the position that, by reason thereof, this appeal was likewise untimely. Both
positions were presented on Motion for Summary Disposition herein, and both were
rejected pending briefing.
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13, a party is entitled to petition an "agency" to
reconsider its ruling. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3), filing and disposition of
such a request tolls the period for seeking judicial review.
A.

The filing of a request for reconsideration tolls the appeal period.

DWS argued in its motion that Petitioner first petitioned this Court 34 days after
CSRB issued its June 28, 2006 ruling, and that the Petition is therefore time-barred under
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(3)(a). DWS acknowledged, however, that during that
interim, Petitioner filed a request for reconsideration with CSRB.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-13 permits any party to an administrative proceeding to
request reconsideration of any "order [that] would otherwise constitute final agency
action" within 20 days of issuance of such order. If a request for reconsideration is
submitted, the head of the agency issuing the order is required to issue a written order
granting the request or denying the request. If no order issues within 20 days of the
request being filed, it is deemed denied by operation of law.
This Court has expressly held that an appeal filed within 30 days after an agency's
disposition of a request for reconsideration is timely, even if filed more than 30 days after
the final agency decision as to which the request was made. In Orton v. Utah State Tax
Collection Division, 864 P.2d 904 (Utah App. 1993), therein, this Court (relying on the
decision of 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996 (Utah App.
1993), held that "A party may file a petition for judicial review within 30 days after the
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order constituting the final agency action . . . 'or' within 30 days after the "deemed
denied' date established by § 63-46b-13(3)(b)." 864 P.2d at 907 (emphasis in original).
In this case, Lorin Blauer has petitioned this Court to review CSRB's June 28,
2006 decision, which it declined to reconsider on July 27,2006 - less than 30 days before
this petition was filed. As such, this petition is not untimely by reason of having been
filed 34 days after issuance of the June 27 decision.
B.

DWS may not bootstrap CSRB's decision to decline jurisdiction over
Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration into a jurisdictional issue for
this Court.

DWS attempted to circumvent the foregoing by saying that, since the CSRB held
that Petitioner's request for reconsideration was untimely, this Court somehow lacks
jurisdiction to hear a petition for review of that decision. DWS' argument in this regard,
though, confuses the jurisdiction of CSRB with the jurisdiction of this Court.
Petitioner herein challenges CSRB's ruling that his request for reconsideration was
untimely. As noted above, that challenge was timely filed before this Court. Whether
CSRB properly or improperly limited its own jurisdiction in this regard is one of the
issues to be reviewed by this Court incident to the petition. It does not, however, go to
the jurisdiction of this Court. The Utah Legislature has conferred jurisdiction upon this
Court to hear appeals from all "final agency actions" wherever a petition is filed within
30 days of the "final agency action", or within 30 days following disposition of a request
to review a "final agency action". Petitioner has met the time limits specified by statute,

770966v2

34

and is properly before this Court. Whether CSRB was correct in holding the request for
reconsideration untimely is a substantive issue to be reviewed by this Court - not a
threshold jurisdictional issue limiting this Court's ability to address the Petition.
CONCLUSION
Lorin Blauer was forced to go on long-term disability leave when his supervisors
at DWS insisted on reassigning him to job responsibilities which known disabilities
precluded himfromperforming. When the resulting leave ended, he was entitled to
ADA-defined accommodation, either by simple reinstatement to his longstanding job
duties (as he had suggested), or to another vacant position the essential functions of which
his disabilities did not prevent himfromperforming. Instead, DWS laid down an
arbitrary demand: come back and do precisely the work that gave rise to your disability,
01 be fired. DWS thus failed to follow regulations incumbent on it, and CSRB failed to
reverse its decision despite the mandate of then-governing law.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of CSRB should be reversed, and Lorin
Blauer ordered reinstated with back pay.
DATED this 5th day of January, 2007.

/

JONES WALDO HO^BROOK & McDONOUGH PC

Vincent C. Rampton
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following this 5th day of January, 2007:
J. Clifford Petersen
Philip S. Lott
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
Kevin C. Timpkin
Acting Chairman
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
State Office Building, Room 1120
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
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FILE COPY:
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD
LORIN BLAUER,
DECISION
AND
FINAL AGENCY ACTION

Grievant and Appellant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES,
Agency and Respondent

CaseNo.9CSRB83

On Tuesday, May 2,2006, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) completed
its final review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an executive
session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the hearing and
deliberated in the executive session: Kevin C. Timken, Acting Chair; Joan M. Gallegos,
Teresa N. Aramaki, and Richard R. McDonald, Board Members. At the hearing, Lorin Blauer
(Appellant) was present and represented by an employee advocate, Tom Cantrell, who presented
oral argument on Appellant's behalf. Assistant Utah Attorney General Philip S. Lott represented
the Utah Department of Workforce Services (Department and DWS) and presented oral argument
on the Department's behalf. Wendy Peterson and Geoffrey T. Landward were present with Mr. Lott
as the Department Representatives.
AUTHORITY
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408
of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which is a sub-part ofthe Utah State
Personnel Management Act at §§67-19-1 etseq. The CSRB's administrative rules are published in
the Utah Admin. Code at R137-1-1 through -23. This Board-level or Step 6 appeal hearing is the
final administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for
Mr. Blauer's appealfromtermination of his employment. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and
these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to
R137-l-18(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)
pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings.
(§§63-46b-0.5e/5^.)
<^tfvn O VL C

Y«J03 Z.U::
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
L PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT

Review of the Step 5 evidentiary record and the appeal briefs filed by the parties establishes
that on October 8,2003, Appellant began taking authorized leave from work for medical reasons.
(Tr.l at 10; Ex. A-5; Hearing Officer's findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order
(Step 5 Decision) f 4 at 2; Grievant's Appeal Brief to CSRB (Appellant's Brief on Appeal) at 9;
Respondent Agency's Step 6 Appellate Brief (Department's Brief on Appeal) at 5) Thereafter, on
January 26, 2004, Appellant applied for Long Term Disability (LTD) Benefits with the Utah
Retirement Systems.1 (Ex. A-l; Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9; Department's Brief on Appeal
at 5)
As part of the LTD application process, Appellant underwent an independent psychological
evaluation. (Ex. A-2; Step 5 Decision f 6 at 3; Appellant Brief on Appeal at 10; Department Brief
on Appeal at 6) This independent psychological evaluation was performed on June 14, 2004, by
Darrell M. Hart, Ph.D. (Dr. Hart). (Id) Dr. Hart's evaluation conclusions were forwarded to
Ms. Jeri Richards, LTD Specialist, Long Term Disability Program, Public Employees' Health
Program (PEHP).2 (Ex. A-2) In his evaluation conclusions, Dr. Hart specifically represents that
Appellant sufferedfrompsychopathology and that this psychopathology in fact rendered Appellant
totally unable "to perform his normal work as assigned in midyear 2003." (Id)
On July 14,2004, PEHP notified Appellant and the Department that Appellant had been
approved for LTD benefits based upon "psychological illness." (Exs. A-3, A-4; Step 5 Decision ^ 6
at 3; Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 9; Department Brief on Appeal at 6) In granting its approval
ofAppellant's request for LTD benefits, PEHP specifically informed Appellant that "your long term
disability benefits were approved for a maximum of two years, based on psychological illness. Our

!

Though there was no testimony or documentary evidence regarding the Utah Retirement Systems,
it is evidentfromthe evidentiary record that the Utah Retirement Systems administers and oversees
Long Term Disability Benefits for State employees. This fact, however, is of little relevance in that
neither party disputes that Appellant applied for LTD benefits to cover his leave which began on
October 8,2003.
2

Iike the Utah Retirement Systems, there is no testimony or documentary evidence regarding
PEHP. However, it is evidentfromthe evidentiary record that PEHP administers LTD benefits for
the Utah Retirement Systems and that Ms. Richards is a LTD Specialist with PEHP. Again, these
facts are of little relevance in this dispute and are added for clarity only.
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 9 CSRB 83
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program allows benefits to a disabled worker for a maximum of two years if psychopathology
primarily causes the disability." (Ex. A-4; Step 5 Decision % 8 at 3)
On October 1,2004, the Department notified Appellant that the one-year period of allowable
medical leave under the State's LTD leave rules was coming to a conclusion.3 (Tr. I at 24-26;
Ex. A-5; Step 5 Decision 110 at 3) In this October 1,2004 notification, the Department reminded
Appellant of his right to contact Department personnel and arrange to return to work at the
conclusion of his LTD leave. This notification also informed AppeUant of his need to provide a
medical release before his employment could be restored and that if he failed to return to work at
the end of the one-year period, his employment would be terminated. (Id.)
On October 4, 2004, Vincent C. Rampton, Attorney at Law, responded on behalf of
Appellant to the Department's October 1, 2004 letter. (Ex. G-24)4 Appellant's October 4, 2004
response letter unambiguously asserted that Appellant's medical condition had not changed and that
he remained disabled but also asserted that Appellant remained "able to perform the essential
functions of... the position he occupied prior to demotion." (Id)5
As of October 8, 2004, AppeUant had not returned to work. Based upon these facts, the

3

DHRM rule R477 specifically provides that "medical leave begins on the last day the employee
worked." (UtahAdmin. Code R477-7-17(l)(a)) There is no factual dispute that AppeUant's last day
of work was October 8,2003.
4

Throughout the proceedings before the CSRB relating to AppeUant's dismissal, he has been
represented by Tom Cantrell, an advocate. However, Vincent C. Ramptonfiledwith the CSRB the
appeal of AppeUant's dismissalfromemployment with the Department and continues to represent
Appellant in matters coUateral to these proceedings.
5

The issue of demotion is one of the coUateral proceedings AppeUant is pursuing. In a grievance
originallyfiledwith the CSRB on October 15,2003, Appellant argued that in September 2003 when
the Department began requiring Appellant to conduct unemployment hearings fuU time with no
change in job title or pay rate, he was in fact demoted. In an Administrative Review of the File
dated November 12,2003, the CSRB dismissed AppeUant's grievance finding it had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate his claims because there was no demotion. On November 30,2004, in a review of the
CSRB's administrative ruling, the Third District Court ruled that the Department "did not demote
the [Grievant]" when it assigned him to perform duties of an administrative law judge and that "the
CSRB was correct in reaching the same conclusion." Blauer v. Department ofWorkforce Services
CivUNo. 040900221. Appellantthen appealed the Third District Court's decision to the Utah Court
of Appeals. On November 10, 2005, the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that "DWS did not
demote Blauer, and thus, the CSRB did not err in declining jurisdiction over Matter's grievance.
Blauer v. Department ofWorkforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204 (Utah Ct App. 2005)

Department again notified Appellant in a letter dated October 8,2004, that his position of Legal
Enforcement Counsel m continued to be open and available for him to return to. In addition, this
letter further informed Appellant of his right to have a hearing prior to any termination of his
employment for failure to return to work. (Tr. I at 27; Ex. A-6; Step 5 Decision ^ 12 at 3-4;
Department Brief on Appeal at 8-9) Appellant never returned to work.
On October 27,2004, a hearing on Appellant's failure to return to work was held before
Department Representative Scott Steele (Mr. Steele), who was designated by then Executive
Director Raylene Ireland (Exec. Dir. Ireland)6 to conduct Appellant's predismissal hearing.
(Ex. A-7)7 Following this hearing, Mr. Steele reported his recommendations to Exec. Dir. Ireland.
After meeting with Mr. Steele, Exec. Dir. Ireland determined that the "department really had
no other position it could take except to move forward with termination." (Tr. I at 122) Exec. Dir.
Ireland then issued her letter terminating Appellant's employment. (Ex. A-7) The effective date of
Appellant's dismissal was November 3,2004. (Id)
In Exec. Dir. Ireland's written decision, she specifically indicated that Appellant's
termination from employment was based on the fact that he was unable or unwilling to return to
work after being on LTD for one year as required by DHRM rule.8 Specifically addressing
Appellant's failure to return to work, Exec. Dir. Ireland stated:
On October 1,2004, you were sent a letter regarding your return to
work. You indicated during the hearing that you are unable to return
to your previous work assignment. You were offered a position at
the Department of Workforce Services with the same title and pay
range. However, you have declined to accept the duties that have
been assigned to this position.
Based upon these factors, Exec. Dir. Ireland concluded that "I have no choice but to terminate your
employment. This decision is based upon your medical leave of longer than one year, and the fact

6

At the time of Appellant's dismissal, Raylene Ireland was the Executive Director of the
Department Since that time, Tani Pack-Downing has been appointed as Executive Director of the
Department The Board notes that on October 8,2003, when Appellant first went on LTD leave,
Executive Director Downing was in fact Appellant's supervisor.
7

Utah Cade Ann § 67-19-18 allows predismissal hearings to be held by the "department head or
designated representative " (emphasis added)
8

DHRM personnel rules are found at Utah Admin. Code R477 et seq.
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that we offered you a job, which you declined." (Id.)
Thereafter, on November 16,2004, Appellant timely filed an appeal of his dismissal from
employment with the CSRB. As set forth above, this appeal was filed by Mr. Rampton who
specifically indicated that "while I [Mr. Rampton] will be advising Mr. Blauer in connection with
this appeal, he will be represented before the Career Service Review Board by Mr. Tom Cantrell."
n.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE

CSRB

On August 17-18,2005, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held in this matter before CSRB
Hearing OflBcer Kenneth R. Wallentine. At this hearing, Appellant was represented by advocate
Tom Cantrell. The Department was represented by Assistant Utah Attorney General Philip S. Lott
Assisting Mr. Lott as the Management Representative was JoAnne Campbell (Ms. Campbell),
Human Resources Director, DWS.
The statute authorizing the CSRB to hold an evidentiary hearing can be found at Utah Code
Ann. § 67-19a-406. Moreover, because Appellant was dismissed from his employment, the
Department has the burden of going forward with the evidence and proving its case by substantial
evidence. (Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(a) and (c))
The specific issues adjudicated at the Step 5 evidentiary hearing were twofold. First, did the
Department terminate Appellant's employment to advance the good of the public service or for just
cause as required by Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18? Second, if substantial evidence does not support
the Department's decision to terminate Appellant's employment, what is the appropriate remedy?
(Prehearing Conference Summary and Order % 3 at 2; Step 5 Decision at 2)
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, the Hearing Officer received evidence relating to
the specific reasons supporting the Department's decision to terminate Appellant's employment.
This evidence included testimony given and documents received concerning the factual basis
supporting the Department's decision and whether its actions were in compliance with State statutes
and personnel rules.
Specifically, testimony was given and documentary evidence received establishing that in
October 2003, Appellant began taking authorized leave for medical reasons. (Tr. I at 10; Ex. A-5)
In addition, evidence was received concerning Appellant's authorized request for, and the eventual
approval by PEHP of, LTD benefits. (Exs. A-l, A-3, A-4) There was also evidence received
concerning the Department's notification to Appellant of State personnel rules that limited
Appellant's right to return to work to one year from his last day worked. (Ex. A-5) Evidence was
Rlaner v Den't of Workforce Services. 9 CSRB 83

also received showing the Department's efforts notifying Appellant of the conditions he must meet
in order for him to be reinstated by the Department (Tr. I at 24-26, 52; Exs. A-5, A-6)
The evidentiary hearing also included extensive evidence concerning the Department's
actions after determining that Appellant was unable or unwilling to return to the Department as
Legal Counsel m performing the duties he performed immediately preceding his medical leave of
absence. (Tr. I at 29-30, 61-62; Tr. II at 293; Exs. A-6. G-24).9 This evidence included specific
efforts by the Department to ensure Appellant that his position would be open and available to him
and that prior to any final determinations being made as to his employment with the Department,
he would have an opportunity to meet with the Executive Director's designee in a predismissal
hearing. (Tr. I at 27; Ex. A-6) Finally, extensive evidence was received regarding Appellant's
concerns that the Department's actions of terminating his employmentviolated State personnel rules
and statutes regarding LTD leave and dismissals. (Exs. G-9, G-30-16; Appellant's Brief on Appeal
at 20-21; Amended Prehearing/Scheduling Conference Summary and Order at 2)
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Step 5 Decision
dated September 19, 2005. In his Step 5 Decision, the Hearing Officer examined the evidence
presented at the hearing and found that the Department had met its burden to show that Appellant
failed to return to work as required by State personnel rules. The Hearing Officer also concluded
that the Department had complied with all relevant statutory and administrative requirements in
reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment. (Step 5 Decision Yl 6 and 10 at 6)
Based upon thesefindings,the Hearing Officer concluded that the Department's termination
of Appellant's employment was not excessive, disproportionate nor did it constitute an abuse of
discretion. (Step 5 Decision K 11) The Hearing Officer further concluded that the Department's
termination of Appellant's employment was for the good of the public service and otherwise for just
cause based on Appellant's failure to return to work following expiration of the maximum period
of disability leave. (Id)

9

As set forth above, in September 2003, the Department began requiring Appellant to conduct
unemployment hearings full time. Prior to September 2003, conducting unemployment hearings was
a minor component of Appellant's daily work duties, but as held by the Utah Court of appeals,
holding unemployment hearings has always been a "core job function" of the Legal Enforcement
Counsel III position. (Blauer v. Department of Workforce Services, 128 P.3d 1204,1211 (Utah Ct
App. 2005)
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 9 CSRB 83
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ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. ISSUES ON APPEAL

In his appeal before this Board, Appellant challenges numerous aspects of the Hearing
Officer's Step 5 Decision. Specifically, Appellant contests many of the Hearing Officer's factual
findings, asserting that thesefindingswere not based on substantial evidence and that the Hearing
Officer failed to "address the case as it was brought before him." (Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 22)
Addressing the Hearing Officer's findings in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, Appellant states: "His
findings of fact appear to be rational and accurate, but most are skewed a little off point with the
cumulative effect of misstating the case." (Id.) Indeed, Appellant concludes that the Hearing
Officer's findings are skewed sufficiently that "it doesn't even seem to be the same case." (Id.)
Appellant also argues that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department had
complied with all relevant statutory and administrative requirements in reaching its decision to
terminate Appellant's employment. Specifically addressing this issue, Appellant argues that the
Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department offered Appellant the opportunity to return
to the same position he held prior to going on LTD. (Step 5 Decision f 7 at 6) In support of his
position, Appellant argues that because the Department expected Appellant to perform
unemployment hearings full time upon his return, he was in fact not being returned to the position
he "previously held." (Appellant's Brief on Appeal at 20-22) Based upon these factors, Appellant
asserts that the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department complied with DHRM rule
R477-7-17(3)(a). (Id.)
In essence, Appellant challenges the Hearing Officer's findings that substantial evidence
supported the essential facts relied upon by the Department in reaching its decision to terminate
Appellant's employment. He further argues that the Hearing Officer erred by legally concluding that
in reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment, the Department correctly applied all
pertinent statutes, rules and policies as mandated by UtahAdmin. CWeR137-l-21(3)(a)(ii). Indeed,
the substance of Appellant's argument before this Board appears to be that the Department did not
offer to place Appellant in his "previously held position" of Legal Counsel HI, but rather offered to
place him in the different or lesser position of "Administrative Law Judge" thereby requiring him
to perform functions for which he was disabled from performing. Based upon these factors,
Appellant argues the Hearing Officer erred in concluding that the Department complied with State
rules and statutes in reaching its decision to terminate his employment.

•

v

*
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n . THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review Appellant's appeal under Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a) through
(c), which reads as follows:
(a) The board shallfirstmake a determination of whether the factual
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational
according to the substantial evidence standard. When the board
determines that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are
not reasonable and rational based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as
a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct the factual
findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings.
(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of
the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected
the factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a
whole, the board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing
officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes
in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing
officer.
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the
CSRB hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed
by the agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate
factualfindingsand correct application ofrelevant policies, rules, and
statutes determined according to the above provisions.
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies,
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to die Hearing Officer
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the
Department's disciplinary penalty of termination of Mr. Blauer's employment is reasonable and
rational based upon our determination of the ultimate facts together with die correct application of
relevant State policies, rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer.

1 t i i ; . ( 'i
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BOARD'S REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL
I. FACTUAL EVENTS PRECEDING THE DEPARTMENT'S
TERMINATION OF APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT

AS stated above, the Board's first obligation on review is to make a determination ofwhether
the factualfindingsof the Hearing Officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial
evidence standard. (Utah Admin. Code R137-l-22(4)(a)) In the instant case, the Hearing Officer
received testimonyfromnumerous witnesses, including Appellant himself, regarding Appellant's
failure to returnfromLTD leave within one year as required by DHRM rule R477-7-17. Exhibits
were also introduced by the parties establishing a sequence of events occurring up to the time
Appellant's employment with the Department was terminated. This documentary evidence included,
but was not limited to, his application and eventual approval for LTD benefits; the Department's
letter outlining requirements for Appellant to return to work, and; the Department's actions after
determining that Appellant was unable or unwilling to return to the Department as a Legal
Counsel HI performing the duties he performed immediately preceding his medical leave of absence.
(Exs. A-l, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6, G-24)
After carefully considering the testimony given at the evidentiary hearing and reviewing the
documents received into evidence, the Hearing Officer issued his decision. This decision set forth
several dispositive facts crucial to his final decision. Among other facts, the Hearing Office
specifically found that the last day Appellant worked for the Department was October 8,2003, when
Appellant began taking authorized leavefromwork for medical reasons. (Step 5 Decision f 4at 2)
He also found that Appellant was approved for LTD benefits based on psychopathological illness.
(Id. t | 6-7at 3) The Hearing Officer further found that on October 1,2004, the Department notified
Appellant that the one-year period of allowable medical leave under the State's LTD leave rules was
coming to a conclusion and that Appellant's position of Legal Counsel HI continued to be open and
available for him to return. (Id. Kf 10,14-16,22 at 3-5) In addition, the Hearing Officer also found
that Appellant never provided the Department with any notice or indication that he was no longer
fully disabled due to his psychopathological illness. (Id. f 19 at 4) Finally, the Hearing Officer found
that Appellant failed to return to work within one year as required by DHRM rule. (Id. % 24 at 5)
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the sworn testimony
of the witnesses and the documents admitted into evidence, this Boardfindsthe Hearing Officer's
v£t1aii#>r \i TW*'t nf Worlrfnrr* ^prvira* 9 C S R B 83
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factual findings as set forth in his Step 5 Decision both reasonable and rational and supported by
substantial evidence.10 In reaching this decision, the Board stresses that it has consistently held that
thefindingsmade by a fact finder are entitled to a presumption of correctness. {Chournos v. Utah
Dep't of Workforce Services, 8 CSRB 74 (Step 6 2004), Jones v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 4
CSRB 38 (Step 6 1992); Seeateo Parks and Recreation v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at 7-8 (1986))11 In
granting such deference to the hearing officer's factualfindings,the Board notes that it is the hearing
officer who is in the best and most unique position to hear the testimony, weigh the evidence and
judge the veracity of the witnesses' various statements.
During the evidentiary hearing held in this matter, substantial and persuasive testimony and
documentary evidence was provided supporting the Hearing Officer's factual findings. Specifically,
the evidence establishes that on October 8, 2003, Appellant began taking authorized leave from
work for medical reasons. (Tr. I at 2; Ex. A-5) The evidence further establishes that on January 26,
2004, Appellant applied for LTD benefits with the Utah Retirement Systems. (Ex. A-1) As part of
the LTD application process, Appellant underwent an independent psychological evaluation.
(Ex. A-2) This independent psychological evaluation was performed on June 14,2004, by Dr. Hart
(Id.)
Dr. Hart's evaluation findings were forwarded to PEHP for determination of Appellant's
eligibility for LTD benefits. (Ex. A-2) In his evaluation conclusions, Dr. Hart specifically provides:
My task is to determine if Mr. Blauer suffers from psychopathology.
* **

1.

Is the examinee suffering from psychopathology?

10

CSRB rule R137-1-2 defines substantial evidence to be "evidence possessing something of
substance and relevant consequence, and which furnishes substantial basis of factfromwhich issues
tendered can be reasonably resolved. It is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion, but is less than a preponderance." Addressing substantial evidence courts
have found that substantial evidence "is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v State,
903 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1995), quoting First Nt'l Bank v. County Bd of Equalization, 799 P.2d
1163,1165 (Utah 1990); see also Grace Drilling v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63,68 (Utah Ct App.
1989) Substantial evidence "is more than a mere 'scintilla' of evidence and something less than the
weight ofthe evidence." Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial Comm *n, 842 P.2d 910,911 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992)
"The PRB was the Personal Review Board, the predecessor for the Career Service Review Board.
Bhroe^v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 9 CSRB 83
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Response: Mr. Blauer
psychopathology.

is

indeed

suffering

from

* * *

2.

If yes, does the condition cause a total inability to perform his
normal work?
Response: Yes. The condition does cause a total inability to
perform his normal work as assigned in mid year 2003.

(Ex. A-2 at 1 and 13)
This evaluation further provided that:
Psychologically, this man does not want to return to the workplace,
irrespective of whatever accommodations might be made for him
And, if he is forced to do so his anxiety and depression will be
debilitating. He won't function well because of those psychological
conditions. And, he doesn't want to be there. Unfortunately, there
are two victims here. The system is victimized by a man who is
unwilling and psychologically limited to accommodate to job
performance expectations in a changing workplace. Mr. Blauer is a
victim because of unwanted physical challenges and
psychophysiological vulnerabilities . . . insufficient psychological
resilience to work within the changing work setting as well as to fight
off a tendency to allow his psychology to cause or exacerbate the
physical problems.
(Id. at 12)
In addition, the record further establishes that on July 14,2004, PEHP notified Appellant and
the Department that Appellant had been approved for LTD benefits based upon "psychological
illness." (Exs. A-3, A-4) In granting its approval of Appellant's request for LTD benefits, PEHP
informed Appellant that "your [Appellant's] long term benefits were approved for a maximum of
two years, based on psychological illness. Our program allows benefits to disabled workers for a
maximum of two years if psychopathology primarily causes the disability." (Ex. A-4) (emphasis
added)
By letter dated October 1,2004, the Department notified Appellant that the one-year period
of allowable medical leave under the State's LTD leave rules was coming to a conclusion. (Tr. I at
24-26; Ex. A-5) This October 1,2004 notification letter specifically provided that:
Last year, you were placed on leave for a medical reason, and
subsequently were found eligible for the Long Term Disability
Program (LTD). The Department of Human Resource Management
rule R477-7-17(l) states that employees shall be granted up to one
year of medical leave under those conditions. Our records show that
r»

;
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your last day worked was October 8,2004.
If your condition has improved and you are able to return to work,
please contact Wendy Peterson . . . so that we can arrange for your
return. If you are still unable to return to work, your employment
with the Department will be terminated. Termination of your
employment under these circumstances does not affect your
eligibility for rehire.
* **

You have until October 5, 2004 to contact Wendy and arrange for
your return to work, or submit written documentation as to why your
employment with the department should not be terminated at this
time. If you are able to return to work, you will need to provide a
medical release.
(Ex. A-5)
Regarding the Department's requirement that Appellant provide a medical release,
Ms. Campbell testified as follows:
A.

When people are on long-term disability there's a
requirement that we keep them on abeyance on our payroll
one yearfromthe time they left the department for a medical
reason. Once that year is up it's routine for us to send them a
letter that says, "Are you able to come back to work?" Ifthey
are able to come back to work with a release they are placed
back in the department. If they are not then we do take them
off of the state payroll system.

Q.

When a letter such as Exhibit 5 is sent to an employee that's
been on medical leave does the employee have any obligation
to do anything?
They do. They have the obligation to contact whichever HR
specialist is listed in the letter to arrange for their return...
The letter also indicates that -that there's a - a request for a
medical release?
That's right.
And what's the purpose of that?
Well, to determine if, in fact, they are now no longer disabled
and able to return to work.
. . . Would Workforce Services uniformly require a medical
release for - for work after one year of medical leave?
That would be the practice, yes.

***

A.
A.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
(Tr. I at 24-26,52)

Substantial evidence also supports the Hearing Officer's finding that on October 4, 2004,
Appellant, through Mr. Rampton, responded to the Department's October 1, 2004 letter by
Blauer v. Dep't of Woridbrce Services, 9 CSRB 83
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indicating that his medical condition had not changed and that Appellant remained disabled from
performing the duties he performed immediately preceding his medical leave of absence.
(Ex. G-24)12 Regarding his ability to return to work in October 2004, Appellant himself testified at
the evidentiary hearing in this matter as follows:
Q.

A.

You admit that you provided no information from any health
care providers to Mr. Steele verifying that you recovered
from your psychological illness that was the basis for your
long-term disabilities?
Provided no psychological information, no.
* * *

Q.

A.

You admit that you provided no written documentation from
any health care provider stating that you have recovered from
the basis of your long-term disability which was
psychological illness?
Yes.

(Tr. Hat293-294)
Indeed, the evidentiary record establishes that at the time the evidentiary hearing was held
in this matter, more than two years after going on medical leave, Appellant was still receiving LTD
benefits and had not yet received a written release to return to work based upon recovery from
psychological illness. Specifically addressing this issue in the hearing, Appellant testified as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Are you still receiving long-term disability benefits?
Yes.
You have not notified the provider of long-term disability
benefits that you were no longer disabled?
No.
* * *

Q.
A.
Q.

12

Have you received a written release to return to work based
upon recovery of psychological illness?
No.
Have you received any other type of release from a health
care provider based upon recovery of psychological illness?

Importantly, the Board notes that this letter also states that Appellant remained "able to perform
the essential functions of... the position he occupied prior to demotion." The apparent contradiction
highlighted in this letter constitutes the issue that lies at the core of this appeal. In essence, Appellant
argues that the Department never really offered to place him in his "previously held position"
because holding unemployment hearings is not an essential function of the Legal Enforcement
Counsel HI position, but a function assigned to the Administrative Law Judge position. The Board
is not persuaded by Appellant's arguments on this issue for the reasons set forth at pages 16-19
below.

A.

No.

(Tr. Eat294-298)
Moreover, both Ms. Campbell and Mr. Steele testified that at no time prior to his dismissal
did Appellant ever provide notification that the condition upon which Appellant's LTD was based
had been resolved. When Mr. Steele was questioned about the predismissal hearing he conducted,
Mr. Steele testified as follows:
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Who appeared at the hearing?
Lorin was there and Mr. Cantrell was with him, myself and
Wendy Peterson, who was our HR representative for the
hearing.
Were you the person who conducted the hearing?
I did.
* **

Q.
A.

Was Mr. Blauer given the opportunity to present information
at the hearing?
He was.
* **

Q*
A.

Was any information presented to you regarding Mr. Blauer's
psychological condition?
No.
* **

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Were there any - any medical records presented at the
hearing?
Not that I recall, no.
Were there any releases from any health care providers
indicating that Mr. Blauer was able to return to work?
No.

(Tr. I at 60-62)
Similarly, Ms. Campbell testified that Appellant never provided a medical release indicating
he is able to return to work. Specifically addressing this issue, Ms. Campbell testified:
Q.

A»

Are you aware of Mr. Blauer ever providing the agency with
a release from a health care provider indicating that he was
able to return to work?
. . . No.

(Tr. I at 28-29)
In the instant case, substantial evidence also supports the Hearing Officer's findings that by
October 8, 2004, Appellant had not returned to work. Based upon this fact, and Appellant's
October 4,2004 letter, the Department again notified Appellant in a letter dated October 8,2004,
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 9 CSRB 83
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that his position of Legal Enforcement Counsel EI continued to be open and available for him to
return to. However, because of the language set forth in Appellant's October 4,2004 letter and his
failure to report to work on October 8,2004, this letter also informed Appellant of hisrightto have
a hearing prior to any termination of his employment for failure to return to work as required by
DHRM rule. (Tr. I at 27; Ex. A-6) After receiving this correspondence, Appellant did not return to
work.
Finally, the evidentiary record further establishes that on October 27, 2004, a hearing on
Appellant's failure to return to work within one year was held before Department Representative
Mr. Steele. (Ex. A-7) Mr. Steele was designated by Exec. Dir. Ireland to conduct Appellant's
predismissal hearing. (Ex. A-6) As set forth above, the record establishes that at this hearing,
Appellant did not provide a medical release or any other information that he had recovered from the
medical condition upon which his LTD leave had been granted. (Tr. I at 60-62; Tr. II at 93-94)
Based upon these and other representations made to him at this hearing, Mr. Steele recommended
to Exec. Dir. Ireland that Appellant's employment with the Department be terminated for failure to
return to work within one year as required by DHRM rule. (Tr. I at 122)
By letter dated November 3,2004, Exec. Dir. Ireland informed Appellant of her decision to
terminate Appellant's employment. Exec. Dir. Ireland's decision was based upon Appellant's
representations made to Mr. Steele that he was "unable to return to your [Appellant's] previous work
assignment." (Ex. A-7) Specifically, Exec. Dir. Ireland stated:
On October 1,2004, you were sent a letter regarding your return to
work. You indicated during the hearing that you are unable to return
to your previous work assignment. You were offered a position at
the Department of Workforce Services with the same title and pay
range. However, you have declined to accept the duties that have
been assigned to this position.
* * *

I have no choice but to terminate your employment. This decision is
based upon your medical leave of longer than one year, and the fact
that we offered you a job, which you declined.
(Id.)
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board finds that there is more than
substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's factual findings in this case. The record
establishes that in October 2003, Appellant became disabled from performing his
Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position with the Department due to psychological illness. The

record further supports the Hearing Officer's findings that on more than one occasion in
October 2004, the Department informed Appellant that his "previously held position" remained open
and available for him to return to. Finally, the record supports the Hearing Officer's findings that
at the end of the one-year period of allowable LTD leave, Appellant failed to provide the
Department with any direct statement or substantive information that he was not longer disabled due
to severe psychopathological illness or that he was even able to return to work within the time frame
required by statute. (Step 5 Decision at^Jf 19-10 at 4)
After careful review of the evidentiary record, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's
detailed factual findings. The Hearing Officer's findings are clearly supported by substantial
evidence and support the Departments position that its termination of Appellant's employment was
for just cause and to advance the good of the public service.
n . LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING THE DEPARTMENT'S TERMINATION
OF APPELLANT'S EMPLOYMENT FOR FAILURE TO RETURN TO WORK
WITHIN ONE YEAR AS REQUIRED BY DHRM RULE R-477-7-17

On appeal, Appellant argues that the Hearing Officer erred by legally concluding that in
reaching its decision to terminate Appellant's employment, the Department had complied with State
personnel rules governing LTD leave. Indeed, on appeal, Appellant essentially argues that the
Department never offered to place Appellant in his "previously held position" of Legal Enforcement
Counsel DDL Rather, Appellant argues that in reality the Department offered to place Appellant in
the very different or lesser position of "Administrative Law Judge," a position with functions
Appellant was disabled from performing. Based upon these factors, Appellant argues that the
Department violated State personnel rules regarding LTD and that the Hearing Officer erred in
upholding the Department's decision.
After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, including the State's personnel
rules regarding LTD leave, the Board finds Appellant's arguments on this issue sophistic. In so
holding, the Board relies heavily on the evidentiary record which establishes not only that prior to
his dismissalfromemployment, Appellant never provided the Department with any information that
his psychopathological illness had ameliorated to any degree, but also that holding unemployment
hearings has always been a core function of the Department's Legal Enforcement Counsel HI
position.
In reaching this conclusion, the Boardfirstnotes that the conditions upon which an employee
Blauer v. Dep't of Workforce Services, 9 CSRB 83
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may return to work for the State after being on LTD leave can be found at DHRM rule R477-7-17,
which provides that:
(3)

Conditions for return from leave without pay shall include:
(a)

If an employee is able to return to work within one
year of the last day worked, the agency shall place the
employee in the previously held position or similar
position in a comparable salary range provided the
employee is able to perform the essential functions of
the job with or without a reasonable accommodation.
* * *

(c)

If an employee is unable to return to work within one
year after the last day worked, the employee shall be
separated from state employment.

A plain reading of this rule establishes that as a condition precedent, before an employee can
be placed in a previously held position, or any other position for that matter, the formally disabled
employee must be "able to return to work." (Id.) In the instant case, the evidentiary record
establishes that at no time prior to his dismissal from employment did Appellant provide the
Department with any information or give the Department any reason to believe he had recovered
from the medical condition upon which his LTD leave had been granted. (Tr. I at 60-62; Tr. II at
90-94) To the contrary, Appellant's counsel, in a letter dated October 4, 2004, actually and
unambiguously informed the Department that Appellant's illness was unchanged and that he in fact
remained "disabled...." (Ex. G-24)
The Board is also not persuaded that Appellant's assertion in this October 4,2004 letter that
he deemed himself "able to perform the essential functions of... the position he occupied prior to
demotion" was sufficient to inform the Department that he was "able to return to work." (Id.) This
is especially true in light of Appellant's repeated assertions that he "remained disabled" and had
been diagnosed as totally disabled due to a psychopathological illness and in light of the fact the
Department had specifically required that before placing Appellant back to work he would need to
provide a medical release. (Ex. A-5)
Regarding the Department's requirement that Appellant provide a medical release indicating
that he was able to return to work, the Board agrees with the Hearing Officer that the Department
would have been derelict had it "failed to require a medical release clearing Grievant [Appellant]
to work following his diagnosis of pathological illness and the consequent total disability." (Step 5

Decision at 9) Indeed, to suggest that the Department not need obtain such a release would require
the Agency to have "amnesia" with respect to Appellant's disability, a requirement this Board is
unwilling to impose on the Department (Id.) (See Harris v. Harris & Hart, Inc., 206 F.3d 838 (9th
Cir. 2000))
Moreover, the Board finds Appellant's assertion that he was able to perform the essential
functions of the position he held "prior to his demotion" to have been intended to advnace his thenpending litigation rather than as a factual statement of his ability to return to work. As discussed in
note 5, supra, this issue has been resolved, and the Board notes that Appellant was in fact never
demoted and that holding unemployment hearings had always been a "core function of a Legal
Enforcement Counsel HI position." (Step 5 Decision at 6-7; Blauer v. Utah Department of
WorJforce Services, 128 P.3rd 1204, 1210-1211 (Utah Ct. App. 2004)13 Indeed, the record
establishes that the only position Appellant was ever determined to be disabledfromand for which
he was on LTD leave for was the Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position and none other.
Even if the Court of Appeals decision regarding core functions of the Legal Enforcement
Counsel IQ position were ignored, the evidentiary record clearly establishes in and of itself that
holding unemployment hearings is a core function of a Legal Enforcement Counsel III position. The
evidence establishes that in addition to Appellant, other individuals employed by the Department
in the Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position have consistently been required to hold
unemployment hearings as part of their regularly assigned duties. (Tr. I at 84, 86-87) In addition,
because performing such hearings is a core function of the Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position,
the Department has always beenfreeto increase the percentage of time that Appellant or any other
individual in this position is assigned to conduct unemployment hearings in accordance with DHRM
rule R477-3-3. This rule allows management to assign or modify tasks or responsibilities within a
position for any reason deemed appropriate by the Department.
Based upon careful review of the Hearing Officer's Step 5 Decision, as well as the
evidentiary record and the parties' briefs on appeal, the Board finds the Hearing Officer correctly
applied the relevant personnel policies and rules in deciding to uphold the Department's termination
of Appellant's employment. The evidentiary record clearly establishes that the Department offered

13

This decision by the Utah Court of Appeals is entitled to res judicata consideration in this action.
Youren v. Tintic School DisU9 86 P.3d 771 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 94 P.3d 929 (Utah 2004)
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to place Appellant his "previously held position" in conformance with DHRM rule R477-7-17.
Moreover, the evidentiary record supports the Hearing Officer's findings that prior to his dismissal
from employment, Appellant never provided the Department with any information that his
pathological illness had ameliorated to any degree and thus was "able to return to work." Indeed,
the record establishes that in August 2005, when the evidentiary hearing was held in this matter,
Appellant was still receiving LTD benefits and had not yet received a written release to work based
upon recoveryfromhis psychological illness. (Tr. II at 294-298)
Finally, substantial evidence produced at the evidentiary hearing in this matter establishes
that performing unemployment insurance hearings was and continues to be a core and necessary
function of the Department's Legal Enforcement Counsel HI position and a requirement regularly
assigned to individuals employed in this position. Because holding such hearings is a core function
of this position, the Department was well within its rights to assign Appellant, or any other employee
in that position, to perform such hearings on a substantially full time basis. (DRHM rule R477-3-3)
Based upon these factors, the Board upholds the Hearing Officer's decision sustaining the
Department's termination of Appellant's employment. In upholding the Hearing Officer's Step 5
Decision, the Boardfindsthat in accordance with DHRM rule R477-7-17, the Department offered
Appellant his previously held position to which Appellant was either unwilling or unable to return.
Therefore, this Board finds that the Department properly terminated Appellant's employment in
accordance with DHRM rule R477-7-17(3)(c) which directs, in mandatory terms, that an employee
who is "unable to return to work within one year of the last day worked... shall be separated from
state employment." (emphasis added)
DECISION
The Board has addressed the issues raised by Appellant in his appeal. After thoroughly
reviewing the evidentiary record and carefully studying the legal issues raised by the parties before
this Board, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision for the reasons set forth herein and
denies Appellant's appeal to this Board. The Board finds the Hearing Officer's decision to be
reasonable and rational and supported by substantial evidence. The Board further finds that the
Hearing Officer correctly applied all pertinent rules and policies in rendering his decision. Based
upon the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing in this matter, the Board finds the

Department's decision to be based on just cause and to advance the good of the public service and
thus upholds the Hearing Officer's decision sustaining Appellant's dismissal.
It is so ORDERED this 28th day of June 2006.
DECISION UNANIMOUS
Kevin C. Timken, Acting Chair
Joan M. Gallegos, Member
Teresa N. Aramaki, Member
Richard R. McDonald, Member

evin C. Timken, Acting Chair
RECONSIDERATION
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudicative decision andfinalagency action
by complying with Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(10), and Utah Code §63-46b-13, Utah Administrative
Procedures Act
JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to
Utah Administrative Ciwfe, R137-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act
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LORINBLAUER
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S
REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF THE BOARD'S DECISION
AND FINAL AGENCY ACTION

Grievant and Appellant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES,
Agency and Respondent

Case No. 9 CSRB 83

On Thursday, July 20, 2006, Grievant, through his representative, Tom Cantrell, filed a
document with the Career Service Review Board (CSRB) entitled "Request for Reconsideration of
Decision and Final Agency Action." (Request for Reconsideration) This document states that
Grievant "submits to the Career Service Review Board (CSRB), this Request for Reconsideration
ofDecision and Final Agency Action in accordance with Utah Administrative Code, Rl 3 7-1 -22( 10),
and Utah Code § 63-46b-13, Utah Administrative Procedures Act" These administrative and code
sections relate solely to requests for reconsideration.
Utah Code Arm. § 63-46M3 states:
Within 20 days after the date that an order is issued for which review
by the agency or by a superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is
unavailable, and if the order would otherwise constitute final agency
action, any party may file a written request for reconsideration with
the agency
(Emphasis added)
DECISION
The Decision and Final Order was issued on June 28, 2006. Appellant's Request for
Reconsideration wasfiledon July 20,2006 - 22 days after the Decision and Final Agency Action
was issued. Thus, the CSRB has no alternative but to deny Appellant's Request for Reconsideration
as it was untimely filed.

It is so ORDERED this 27th day of July 2006.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action pursuant to
Utah Administrative Code, Rl 37-1-11, and Utah Code, §63-46b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative Procedures Act
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this 27th day of July 2006,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, the foregoing
Denial of Appellant's Requestfor Reconsideration ofthe Board's Decision and Final Agency
Action in the matter of Lorin Blauer v. Utah Department of Workforce Services to the following:
HLorin Blauer
460 North 900 East
Bountiful UT 84010-2824
(2) I sent an E-mail of the original document to the following:
^ r i a n Blake
Paralegal
Office of the Attorney General
BBLAKE@utah.gov

irfani Downing
Executive Director
Utah Dept. of Workforce Services
TDOWNING@utah.gov

^JbAnne Campbell
Human Resources Director
Utah Dept of Workforce Services
JCAMPBE@utah.gov

v^Phihp S. Lott
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Litigation Division
PHILLOTT@utah.gov

^Tom Cantrell
National Administrative Law Advocates
advocates@tomcantrell.com

and (3) I faxed a copy of the original document to:
ST

Philip S. Lott
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General
Litigation Division
801366.0150

Claudia L. Jones
Legal Secretary

Jennifer Wakefield
Human Resources Specialist
Utah Dept of Workforce Services
WENDYPETERSON@utah.gov

